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Summary
This research paper reflects on the myriad ways in which militarised and criminalised forms 
of authority in South Sudan, specifically militias and gangs interpret norms around gender 
equality and the prevention of gender-based violence (GBV). It is founded on extended local 
fieldwork conducted throughout the first half of 2019 across four field locations, including: 
Wau Town in Western Bahr el Ghazal State; Yirol East in Lakes State; Ganyiel in Unity State; 
and the Juba Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites on the base of the United Nations Mission 
in South Sudan (UNMISS) in the capital city. It contemplates the complex position of the 
primarily male youth who comprise the basis of both gangs and militias, considering the ways 
that these groups transcend, resist and reinforce the patriarchal gender norms that underpin 
the otherwise high levels of GBV that have been witnessed in the country, especially since 
the start of the civil war on 15th December 2013. It shows that, even where parochialism is 
resisted, the perceptions and practices of these groups when it comes to gender and GBV 
strengthen traditional gender roles that equate women with wives and child-bearers and 
treat them as commodities in the country’s political marketplace. The result is that, despite 
changes to women’s roles and responsibilities as a result of the constant flux generated by 
protracted conflict, the secondary status of marginalised groups, such as women, has been 
systematically reinforced. 
Policy Implications  
Excluded from the recent Revitalized-Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic 
of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the community-embedded armed groups considered in this 
research paper are now a major source of potential instability. Understanding why these 
groups resort to violence and crime, including GBV, as well as how they search for a sense 
of inclusion, can prove incredibly valuable in actually transforming conflict beyond the remit 
of the peace deal.  Indeed, more attention to the ways in which informal, non-state forms of 
public authority perpetuate structures of violence and discrimination can help develop ensure 
that policies actually translate into new norms and practices, whether in relation to gender 
and GBV, or in relation to ending conflict and violence more generally. While more detailed 
research is needed, as this paper shows, there is a need to find new and creative ways of 
addressing the absence of opportunities and avenues for belonging that provide the members 
of community-embedded armed groups with a sense of inclusion and an alternative avenue 
for accessing resources that still emphasises their desire for independence from otherwise 
exclusionary structures. Although this point has been reiterated through previous research, 
there is a critical need to work much more directly with those actually implicated in violence 
and crime and ensuring that non-state forms of public authority, including militias and gangs 
are integrated into interventions that seek to transform both conflict and gender in fragile, 
conflict-affected environments like South Sudan. Many of the members of community-
embedded armed groups interviewed for this research had not been engaged in external 
actors. This is essential for ensuring ownership over norms of non-violence, including those 
prohibiting GBV and encouraging gender equality. 
5        Violence, Crime and Gender in South Sudan: Reflections from the Field on Militias and Gangs
Acronyms
ARCSS: Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CSRV: Conflict-related sexual violence 
GBV: Gender-based violence 
PoC: Protection of Civilian 
R-ARCSS: Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan 
SPLA: Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
SPLA-IO: Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition 
SSPDF: South Sudan People’s Defense Forces 
UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan
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I. Research Introduction 
International efforts that seek to prevent violence 
and build peace in fragile, war-torn environments 
often focus on the formal groups vying for 
authority at the centre. Yet, as is well-known, there 
are an assortment of informal structures of power 
that govern political and social life and that are 
responsible for activities as varied as generating 
revenue and controlling behaviour, including the 
use and non-use of violence.1 Nowhere is this 
more true than in South Sudan where the state has 
been a distant reality in the lives of much of the 
population, particularly in the country’s variegated 
peripheries where it is, at times, resisted as 
something invasive and alien when it comes to 
community life.2 These informal structures of 
power or what are typically referred to as ‘public 
authority’ encompass a wide array of actors 
from customary chiefs, to spiritual leaders, to the 
numerous community-embedded armed groups 
that frequently find themselves outside the state’s 
formal reach.3 They exist alongside and, at times, 
contend with more formal state forces in ways 
that challenge conventional notions of the state’s 
monopoly on violence, forcing policymakers to 
contemplate how, and with whom to engage to 
promote peace.4 
Importantly, for the purposes of this research 
paper, different forms of pubic authority, whether 
“constructive” or “corrosive”5 possess their own 
moral codes that can either transcend, resist 
or reinforce norms that facilitate violence and 
discrimination.6 This includes norms related 
to gender equality and different forms of GBV. 
Accordingly, the paper presented here provides 
some initial reflections on how militarised and 
criminalised forms of non-state public authority, 
specifically rural militias and urban gangs, 
1  See, Lund, C. (2006). Twilight institutions: Public authority and local politics in Africa. Development and Change 37(4): 685-705. 
2  See, Leonardi, C., Moro, L. N., Santschi, M., & Isser, D.H. (2010). Local justice in Southern Sudan. Peaceworks No. 66.
3  See, Pendle, N. (2018). Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War; Ibreck, R., & Pendle, N. 
(2016). Customary Protection? Chief’s courts as public authority in UN Protection of Civilian sites in South Sudan. JRSP Paper 34.  
4  See, de Waal, A, Sarkar, A, Detzer, S and Spatz, S. (2020). A theory of change for violent political marketplaces. CRP Memo. 
5  Meagher, K. (2012). The strength of weak states? Non-state security forces and hybrid governance in Africa.” Development and 
Change 43(5): 1073.1101; cited in, Ibreck, R., & Pendle, N. (2016). Customary Protection? Chief’s courts as public authority in UN Protec-
tion of Civilian sites in South Sudan. JRSP Paper 34.  
6  See, Danish Refugee Council. (2017). Dynamics of youth and violence: Findings from Rubkona County, Unity State; Pendle, N. (2018). 
Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War. 
7  Pendle, N. (2018). Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War.
8  Pendle, N. (2018). Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War.
9  Pendle, N. (2018). Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War. 
understand gender relations and interpret norms 
around gender equality and the prevention of GBV. 
It looks at what have been referred to elsewhere 
as community-embedded armed groups, which 
incorporate anything from youth gangs, to 
vigilante groups, to rural militias, to communal 
fighters.7 Still, they frequently share particular 
characteristics, encompassing mostly young 
males from local communities who defend local 
interests, situated between their participation in 
the group and community life.8 
Emphasising gender and GBV within the context 
of these more violent forms of non-state public 
authority could provide a useful lens through 
which to understand the motivations for violent 
behavior more generally, while at the same 
time supplementing the work on conflict and 
community-based armed groups in South 
Sudan with a much-needed gender perspective. 
As other research has highlighted, the ways in 
which communities understand violence against 
women and other marginalised groups can 
provide important insights into the principles 
and practices that influence the functioning 
of groups that exist beyond the state.9 What’s 
more, excluded from the recent R-ARCSS on 12 
September 2018, these community-embedded 
armed groups are now a major source of 
potential instability.  Understanding why these 
groups resort to violence and crime, including 
GBV, as well as how they search for a sense of 
inclusion, can prove incredibly valuable in actually 
transforming conflict. 
Along those lines, the initial findings of the 
paper are in many ways consistent with other 
research on gendered and sexualised violence in 
conflict-affected settings. More specifically, the 
research supplements existing work, showing 
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how understandings and rules on gender and 
GBV, as well as the use of GBV serve a number 
of functions in crisis, laying the foundations for 
newly configured societal relations, as well as 
reinforcing existing ones – often to the detriment 
of the rights of women and girls.10 Accordingly, 
the ways in which rural militias and urban gangs 
interpret and regulate gender and GBV oftentimes 
violently underpin the secondary position of 
women and girls and perceptions of females 
as commodities in South Sudan’s political 
marketplace, which has become increasingly 
relevant in the context of economic decline. At 
the same time, their understandings of gender 
and the use of GBV seem to resist some of the 
more deeply entrenched norms that continue to 
govern relations between the sexes, especially 
as it relates to pre-marital sex. Their interactions 
with the opposite sex, the exercise of GBV and 
rules developed to govern both gender relations 
as well as gendered and sexualised violence 
appear to reflect the need for young men to gain 
independence from community and political 
structures.  It also reveals their desire to reduce 
their reliance on both customary leaders and 
elites for the resources and endorsement that 
they need to reach ideals of responsible adulthood 
and masculinity.11 
In this way, the practices rural militias and urban 
gangs exhibit with respect to gender and GBV 
are indicative of the continued adherence of the 
primarily male youth who comprise militias and 
gangs to the norms associated with family and 
home life elucidated in previous research on South 
Sudan.12 At the same time, it also demonstrates 
the desire of militia and gang members to 
establish their own sense of identity. Violence 
and vigilantism in that sense can be seen as an 
expression of that identity and the need to access 
resources in a setting marked by protracted 
conflict and economic decline. As discussed in 
10  See, Baines, E. (2014). Forced marriage as a political project: sexual rules and relations in the Lord’s Resistance Army. Journal 
of Peace Research 51(3): 405-417; Mackenzie, M. (2010). Securitizing sex? Towards a theory of the utility of wartime sexual violence. 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 12(2): 202-221.
11  See, Leonardi, C. (2007). ‘Liberation’ or Capture: Youth in between ‘hakuma’, and ‘home’ during Civil War and Its Aftermath in South-
ern Sudan. African Affairs 106(424): 391–412. 
12  See, Leonardi, C. (2007). ‘Liberation’ or Capture: Youth in between ‘hakuma’, and ‘home’ during Civil War and Its Aftermath in South-
ern Sudan. African Affairs 106(424): 391–412. 
13  SIHA Network. (2019). Caught in the middle: Gender inequality and rampant SGBV in Wau, South Sudan. 
14  Huser, C. (2014). Micro-Level Insights into Context Analysis in Unity State: Interpretations of the Experience of Violence. Context 
Analysis: 2-36. 
more depth below, the male youth who make up 
rural militias and urban gangs are trapped between 
the structural realities of perpetual violence and 
the day-to-day uncertainties of life in conflict. This 
is not dissimilar to women and girls who end up 
“caught in the middle” 13 of the constant change 
engendered by war and the preservation of highly 
conservative and patriarchal values, both of which 
have continuously reinforced their subordination 
to collective interests. 
II. Methodology 
This research paper seeks to understand the 
“subjective experiences” 14 and understandings 
of those both implicated in and impacted by the 
country’s ongoing violence and fragility, including 
rising criminality in urban centres and increasing 
insecurity in rural areas. The methodology was 
grounded in ethnographic case studies where 
rural militias and urban gangs functioned as 
comparative cases within the four field locations 
where research was carried out. The four field 
locations were: Wau Town in Western Bahr el 
Ghazal State, Yirol in Lakes State, Ganyiel in Unity 
State and the Juba Protection of Civilian (PoC) 
sites on the base of the United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS) in the capital city. Overall 
the research involved around 175 participants, 36 
in-depth individual interviews and 23 focus-group 
discussions, all of which contributed to a much 
more contextualised understanding of armed 
and criminalised forms of public authority in the 
country and concepts of gender and GBV therein. 
The field locations and groups were chosen for a 
variety of reasons. While gangs have been present 
in South Sudan since the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in 2005, their numbers are said 
to have proliferated following the onslaught of the 
war on 15 December 2013. In Wau Town, these 
groups have a long history where they had become 
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an increasingly “sinister and criminal figure” in the 
post-CPA and post-2011 independence periods.15 
Prior to the beginning of the conflict, there was 
considerable controversy surrounding the groups 
since the courts were seen as being too lenient 
on them on account of the proliferation of human 
rights frameworks advocating for the rights 
of juveniles and other marginalised groups. It 
was also said that some of these groups were 
implicated with the governing elite.16 Although the 
PoC sites are new to the war that started in 2013, 
many of the gangs who operate there are not. Still 
the size of the PoC sites, including those in Juba 
means that they resemble something of an urban 
environment in their own right, and as such, have 
become ripe environments for gangs, even where 
they have their origins in post-2005 and post-
2011 South Sudan and the return of many youth 
from the diaspora.  
Rural militias, specifically the gelweng in Lakes 
State and the gojam in Unity State were selected 
for similar reasons. Elites at both the local and 
the national level have a long history of mobilising 
and exploiting agro-pastoralist youth. The 2013 
conflict has been no different with both the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), now 
South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) 
and the SPLA-In Opposition (IO) drawing support 
from these groups to fight their battles. This has 
led to the further erosion of conventional codes 
of conduct during warfare, including with respect 
to the targeting of women and other marginalised 
groups. Both the gelweng and the gojam have 
allegedly been involved in GBV during localised 
and national conflicts since 2013, especially 
in the borderlands between Yirol and Panyjiar 
where conventional restraints on violence have 
limited purchase. Although violence between the 
gelweng and gojam in the area predates 2013, the 
mobilisation of pastoralist youth connected to the 
national conflict reified inter-ethnic divides and 
tensions with SPLA-supported groups of gelweng 
raided Panyjiar during both the 2014 and 2015 
government offensives on southern Unity State.17 
Thereafter, reprisal attacks persisted, which were 
15  Leonardi, C., Moro, L. N., Santschi, M., & Isser, D.H. (2010). Local justice in Southern Sudan. Peaceworks No. 66, p. 59. 
16  Leonardi, C., Moro, L. N., Santschi, M., & Isser, D.H. (2010). Local justice in Southern Sudan. Peaceworks No. 66. 
17  Craze, J., Tubiana, J., & Gramizzi, C. (2016). A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013-15. Small Arms 
Survey. 
18  Kalyvas, S.N. (2003). The ontology of “political violence”: Action and identity in civil wars. Perspectives on Politics 1(3): 475-494. 
oftentimes justified on the basis of recovering 
cattle and atoning for losses incurred in 2014 and 
2015.  
III. Background
Despite the promises that South Sudan’s 
transition to independence on 9 July 2011 initially 
provided, the country was never able to deliver 
on the dividends that peace and independence 
should have produced after the end of the 
22 year-long civil war with the Khartoum 
government in north Sudan. Even after 2011 
chronic insecurity, localised violence and acute 
underdevelopment prevailed. The systematic 
exclusion and fractionalisation born out of the 
second Sudanese civil war between 1983 and 
2005 and the intra-Southern divisions that it 
created also endured. That is until everything fell 
apart on 15 December 2013 when fighting broke 
out between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir 
and Vice President Riek Machar, reflecting wider 
divides within the SPLA and ruling party. The splits 
between communities that existed as a result of 
the 1983-2005 period served as a ready basis for 
the mobilisation of groups against each other 
under the auspices of the national conflict. In 
reality, the war resembled something much closer 
to the classical interpretation of the confluence 
of political and private motivations for violence 
in civil war18 as local grievances quickly formed 
the foundations of the national conflict outside 
of the capital, Juba with sub-national and local 
tensions coming to shape important frontlines in 
the overall conflict. 
The crisis that followed has had immeasurable 
consequences, particularly for the civilian 
population who have been subjected to horrific 
violations, which in addition to directly targeting 
the livelihoods and coping mechanisms of 
citizens, treated people as expendable on the 
country’s political and military battlefields. Millions 
of people have been driven from their homes in 
search of protection elsewhere, frequently more 
than once. 1.6 million people still remain internally 
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displaced,19 around 200,000 of whom continue to 
seek safety shelter on the bases of the UN mission 
in what are referred to as the PoC sites.20 Close to 
400,000 people are estimated to have died as a 
result of the war and thousands of civilians are 
thought to have been subjected to acts of conflict-
related sexual violence (CSRV), including rape, 
gang rape and abduction.21 Female bodies have 
been employed as a reward for participating in 
fighting, with the UN saying that sexual abductions 
are “…encouraged by commanders through their 
promises that the soldiers could take women and 
girls as “wives” for compensation.”22 Women and 
girls are not the only ones who have been treated 
as transactions in the conflict, either. Young men 
and male youth have been prized almost solely 
for the role they play in waring. Similar to the civil 
war with north Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the current conflict has seen youth mobilised by 
elites to fight on their behalf. At the same time, 
they have also been stripped of livelihoods and 
educational opportunities and denied the chance 
to reach ideals of responsible adulthood and 
marriage.23 As one report noted, “[y]oung people 
have been both the greatest perpetrators and 
victims in this war, instrumentalised by political 
and military leaders to fight while also deprived 
of a future, of livelihoods, marriage and of 
establishing themselves as meaningful members 
of society.”24
As has been the case in South Sudan for decades, 
the conflict has been characterised by consistent 
violations of commitments to finally bring an end 
to violence. Various ceasefires and agreements 
were signed after 15 December 2013 only to 
be broken hours and days later. When the first 
iteration of the ARCSS was signed on 17 August 
2015, conflict continued, spreading to previously 
peaceful parts of the country, including to the 
south and west of the country to places, such as 
Wau. The agreement finally met its demise on 
8 July 2016 when fighting once again erupted 
19  IOM DTM. (2020). South Sudan: East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Available at: https://dtm.iom.int/south-sudan. 
20  UNMISS. (2020). UNMISS Protection of Civilian (POC) Sites Update No. 273. Available at: https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss-
protection-civilian-poc-sites-update-no-273-20-april-2020. 
21  Checchi, F. et al. (2018). Estimates of crisis-attributable mortality in South Sudan, December 2013-April 2018: A statistical 
analysis. Health in Humanitarian Crises Center. Available at: https://crises.lshtm.ac.uk/2018/09/26/south-sudan-2/; Amnesty Inter-
national. (2017). Do not remain silent: Survivors of sexual violence in South Sudan call for justice and reparations. Index Number: AFR 
65/6469/2017. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr65/6469/2017/en/.  
22  UN Human Rights Council. 2019. Report of the Commission of Human Rights in South Sudan.” A/HRC/40/69. 
23  Danish Refugee Council. (2017). Dynamics of youth and violence: Findings from Rubkona County, Unity State. 
24  Danish Refugee Council. (2017). Dynamics of youth and violence: Findings from Rubkona County, Unity State, p. 5.  
25  de Waal, A. (2014). When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: The brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan. African Affairs 113: 
349.
between forces loyal to President Kiir and forces 
loyal to Vice President Machar in the presidential 
palace, which acted as a painful reminder of 
the enduring divisions that have marked both 
South Sudan’s birth, as well as its short history. 
Attempts to revive the agreement throughout 
2017 and 2018 culminated in the R-ARCSS 
signed on 12 September 2018 and the eventual 
formation of the transitional government on 22 
February 2020. That being said, akin to both the 
post-CPA and post-independence period, violence 
and insecurity did not end with the peace deal, nor 
did it end with the more recent establishment of 
the transitional government. Localised conflicts 
that had become more politicised as a result of 
the national war that began in 2013 have carried 
on. 
Accordingly, even if the R-ARCSS and formation 
of the transitional government provide the 
opportunity for contemplating a new future for 
the country, there are a number of challenges 
that are inherent to the logic of governance over 
political and even social life that could encumber 
the prospects for transforming conflict and 
violence. Politics continues to be based on what, 
in essence, is a militarised form of monetised 
deal-making in the political marketplace,25 which 
has not only thwarted the development of a state-
citizen contract, but also prevented the state 
itself from delivering on the dividends that any 
of South Sudan’s numerous peace agreements 
should have supplied. Citizens are left with few 
mechanisms for sustainably accessing the 
resources needed for their survival. To be sure, 
successive administrations that have ruled over 
the south have done so through coercion and 
violence. These more structural forms of violence 
enacted by the state in South Sudan now sit 
alongside the unpredictability of everyday life, 
that has only become increasingly uncertain 
as time has gone on. As de Waal makes clear, 
“South Sudan’s political turbulence is akin to the 
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chaotic structure of a stream of water from a 
tap: unpredictable from moment to moment, but 
retaining its basic structure over time.”26 Once 
more, marginalised groups, including women and 
youth bear the brunt of both day-to-day uncertainty 
and the kinds of structural discrimination that 
have existed for decades. Women’s secondary 
status has been systematically reinforced by the 
conflict and its effects. The same goes for youth, 
who despite being excluded from the political and 
military establishment are exploited to perpetrate 
violence on that establishment’s behalf.27 
i. Gender, Youth and Violence in South 
Sudan’s Political Marketplace  
As other research on South Sudan has shown, GBV, 
including CSRV is often rooted in the structural 
violence that women and girls experience in their 
daily lives, particularly with respect to patrilineal, 
bridewealth based marriage practices, which 
commodify female bodies and treat them as 
property both at home and on the frontlines of 
the country’s many conflicts.28 The act of paying 
for women ends up justifying their ill-treatment 
and entitles males to the sexual services of their 
female counterparts.29 As past anthropological 
work amongst the western Dinka has shown, 
women’s resistance to the sexual demands of 
her husband, or “refusing the hut” are not taken 
seriously and can be (mis)construed as a woman 
trying to retain some modicum of propriety.30 This 
can, and oftentimes does, contribute to societal 
perceptions of acts of GBV, such as marital rape, 
as a lesser abuse. As is well-known, bridewealth 
26  de Waal, A. (2014). When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: The brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan. African Affairs 113: 
349. 
27  See, Leonardi, C. (2007). ‘Liberation’ or Capture: Youth in between ‘hakuma’, and ‘home’ during Civil War and Its Aftermath in South-
ern Sudan. African Affairs 106(424): 391–412.
28  See, Luedke, A., & Logan, H. (2018). That thing of human rights: Discourse, emergency assistance, and sexual violence in South 
Sudan’s current civil war. Disasters 42 (SI): S99-S118.
29  Huser, C. (2018). Conflict and Gender Study – South Sudan – Addressing Root Causes Programme. Accord.
30  Jok, J.M. (1999). Militarism, gender and reproductive suffering: The case of abortion in Western Dinka. Africa: Journal of the Inter-
national African Institute 69(2): 194-212.
31  SIHA Network. (2012). Falling Through the Cracks: Reflections on Customary Law and the Imprisonment of Women in South Sudan, 
p. 36. 
32  See, Jok, J.M. (1999). Militarism, gender and reproductive suffering: The case of abortion in Western Dinka. Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute 69(2): 209. 
33  See, SIHA Network. (2019). Caught in the middle: Gender inequality and rampant SGBV in Wau, South Sudan. 
34  SIHA Network. (2012). Falling Through the Cracks: Reflections on Customary Law and the Imprisonment of Women in South 
Sudan. 
35  SIHA Network. (2012). Falling Through the Cracks: Reflections on Customary Law and the Imprisonment of Women in South Sudan. 
36  Jok, J.M. (1999). Militarism, gender and reproductive suffering: The case of abortion in Western Dinka. Africa: Journal of the Inter-
national African Institute 69(2): 209; SIHA Network. (2012). Falling Through the Cracks: Reflections on Customary Law and the Imprison-
ment of Women in South Sudan. 
37  Luedke, A., & Logan, H. (2018). That thing of human rights: Discourse, emergency assistance, and sexual violence in South Sudan’s 
current civil war. Disasters 42 (SI): S99-S118.
can also act as an important driver for intimate 
partner violence, which as research done by civil 
society has shown, “can be viewed as an exercise 
of prerogative rather than an offence.”31 
Notwithstanding the realities of protracted 
conflict and displacement, residence is still 
mostly patrilocal, with women marrying outside 
of their natal kin and settling with the family of 
their husbands.32 Because women leave their own 
families in order to join the compound lineages of 
their husbands, males are oftentimes deemed as 
being worthier of support since they will care for 
their families long after their female counterparts 
have left. This generates a superiority dynamic 
that has been cemented over time.33 It also 
secures women’s agency firmly to that of her 
husband and his family, rendering many married 
women dependent on support from their husband 
and his family– support that has been shown to 
not always be forthcoming.34 For many women 
(and girls) there are few ways out.35 Even after 
a woman’s husband has died, levirate or ghost 
marriage dictates that widowed women will be 
allocated to a male relative of her dead husband.36 
Many of these issues have been exacerbated, 
rather than mitigated by the influence of violence 
and conflict in recent years. In an environment 
that has long denied women access to resources, 
women’s agency, including authority over their 
own bodies and lives, has become increasingly 
restricted by the material circumstances 
associated with South Sudan’s violent political 
marketplace.37 Indeed, as de Waal argues, the 
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logic of the political marketplace reduces social 
connections and individuals to commodities. 38 
This includes women and girls who continue to 
be treated as property that can be exchanged 
like any other good in local political economies, 
where acts of gendered and sexualised violence 
function much like any other spoil of war. It is, 
therefore, unsurprising that CSRV, including 
rape, gang rape, abduction and sexual slavery 
have all been chronic features of South Sudan’s 
conflict since it started over six years ago.39 
This is nothing new either. Prior to the country’s 
independence in 2011 women’s bodies served 
as a form of compensation for participating 
in military operations. For instance, Pinaud 
shows how commanders used the payment of 
bridewealth to generate loyalties within the SPLA 
during the last civil war with north Sudan between 
1983 and 2005.40 As argued in a blog article,41 the 
practices of using female bodies as rewards has 
continued into the current war. More specifically, 
the SPLA (now SSPDF) and other parties to the 
conflict, alongside loosely aligned militias, are 
said to have been given the license to loot and 
pillage with CSRV conceived of as an acceptable 
form of compensation for those involved in the 
country’s violence and instability.42 In the context 
of economic collapse where the maintenance of 
the political marketplace has become increasingly 
precarious, this sort of licensing becomes an 
essential resource that military and political elites 
can dispense to their subordinates. 
Along those lines, the patrilocal, bridewealth-
based marriage practices detailed above simply 
underpin the absence of authority that women and 
girls have over their own bodies, which has been 
intensified by the effects of the conflict. Bride-
wealth has long acted as a justification for early 
38  de Waal, A. (2014). When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: The brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan. African Affairs 113: 
347–369. 
39  Amnesty International. (2017). Do not remain silent: Survivors of sexual violence in South Sudan call for justice and reparations. 
Index Number: AFR 65/6469/2017. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr65/6469/2017/en/.  
40  Pinaud, C. (2014). South Sudan: Civil War, Predation and the Making of a Military Aristocracy. African Affairs 113(451): 192–211. 
41  Luedke, A. (2019). The commodification of women and girls in South Sudan: Increased risks and continued violence. LSE-CRP 
Blogs, 4 April 2019. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2019/04/04/the-commodification-of-women-and-girls-in-south-sudan-in-
creased-risks-and-continued-violence/. 
42  See, UN Human Rights Council. 2019. Report of the Commission of Human Rights in South Sudan.” A/HRC/40/69. 
43  Luedke, A. (2019). The commodification of women and girls in South Sudan: Increased risks and continued violence. LSE-CRP 
Blogs, 4 April 2019. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2019/04/04/the-commodification-of-women-and-girls-in-south-sudan-in-
creased-risks-and-continued-violence/.
44  Justice Africa. (2016). Violence begets violence: Justice and accountability for sexual and gender-based offences in South Sudan. 
Draft Report by Justice Africa in partnership with CEPO and SSWLA: 1-76.  
45  FGD. (13 February 2019). Women Leaders. Wau PoC Site.
child, early and forced marriages. However, with 
the influence of conflict-induced economic crisis 
setting in as early as 2014, along with increasingly 
extreme levels of food insecurity, families and 
communities have become increasingly reliant 
on the income gained from marrying off their 
daughters. Throughout the course of the field 
research, key informants also spoke about women 
and girls being exposed to sexual exploitation 
and abuse in order to make ends meet, with an 
escalating number of females, including under-
age girls apparently entering “lodges” (local 
brothels) to engage in sex work.43 As pointed out 
by Justice Africa and other civil society actors in 
South Sudan, this kind of survival sex is a more 
institutionalised version of the mistreatment that 
women and girls experience as a result of norms 
and practices that reduce them to commodities 
whether on the battlefield, at home, or in their 
communities.44 
Although conflict has triggered a degree of role 
change for women, this role change is probably 
better conceived of as an augmented level of 
responsibility. In the face of widespread physical 
insecurity, women have become almost entirely 
responsible for providing for their families with 
men made idle by displacement, sharp economic 
downturns and conflict. A group of women leaders 
living the Wau PoC site say: “…nowadays things 
are changing. Women and men are working…
it is because of the economic situation and the 
conflict.”45 While this has theoretically offered 
an important opportunity for South Sudanese 
women and girls to finally achieve much-needed 
economic independence, in reality, the need to 
support their families has caused females to 
engage in risky coping mechanisms, further 
binding their agency to their capacity to meet their 
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basic needs.46 Since the necessity for women to 
engage in risky coping mechanisms has regularly 
been based on the potential insecurities faced 
by their male counterparts, the permissibility of 
GBV compared to other abuses is in many ways 
continuously reinforced. 
With women taking on the lion’s share of the 
burden for providing for their households, males 
are presumed to have relinquished their traditional 
responsibilities as providers and protectors, a 
shift in masculine identity that has been said to be 
acute.47 The targeting of livelihoods and ensuing 
displacement brought about by the conflict has 
caused many men to become dependent on 
external aid or the assistance of their relatives in 
order to sustain themselves and their families. 
As has been documented in other research on 
South Sudan, this has contributed to feelings of 
emasculation amongst male populations who 
can no longer live up to their conventional gender 
roles.48 Care duties, including cooking, cleaning 
and procuring food are activities traditionally 
reserved for women and men chance being 
chastised for being feminine for carrying out the 
tasks associated with their wives. Yet, this means 
that the burden on women as breadwinners is 
even larger.49 The result has apparently given 
rise to an increase in conflict between men and 
women at the household level. Participants 
attributed this to men’s declining ability to provide 
for their families and women’s enhanced desire 
for increased autonomy. As one female chief 
noted: “if a woman sees that the man cannot 
take care, she asks for a divorce…the cases are 
increasing.”50  They also attributed it to external 
assistance being directed towards women and 
girls, which has merely aggravated the feelings of 
idleness and exclusion amongst males. Another 
chief that was part of the same focus group 
46  SIHA Network. (2019). Caught in the middle: Gender inequality and rampant SGBV in Wau, South Sudan.
47  Danish Refugee Council. (2017). Congestion in the Malakal Protection of Civilian (POC) Site, South Sudan. A Report by Danish 
Refugee Council.  
48  Danish Refugee Council. (2017). Congestion in the Malakal Protection of Civilian (POC) Site, South Sudan. A Report by Danish Refu-
gee Council; see also, Justice Africa. (2016). Violence begets violence: Justice and accountability for sexual and gender-based offences 
in South Sudan. Draft Report by Justice Africa in partnership with CEPO and SSWLA: 1-76.    
49  SIHA Network. (2019). Caught in the middle: Gender inequality and rampant SGBV in Wau, South Sudan.
50  FGD. (13 February 2019). Chiefs. Wau Town, South Sudan.
51  SIHA Network. (2019). Caught in the middle: Gender inequality and rampant SGBV in Wau, South Sudan.
52  See, Leonardi, C., Moro, L. N., Santschi, M., & Isser, D.H. (2010). Local justice in Southern Sudan. Peaceworks No. 66. 
53  Leonardi, C., Moro, L. N., Santschi, M., & Isser, D.H. (2010). Local justice in Southern Sudan. Peaceworks No. 66. 
54  FGD. (13 February 2019). Chiefs. Wau Town, South Sudan. 
55  See, Leonardi, C., Moro, L. N., Santschi, M., & Isser, D.H. (2010). Local justice in Southern Sudan. Peaceworks No. 66.
56  SIHA Network. (2019). Caught in the middle: Gender inequality and rampant SGBV in Wau, South Sudan.
discussion states how: “…women are weak and 
not resilient. When humanitarian organisations 
come in…and what they do is priority registration 
for women…men are being left behind and this 
happens all the time.” The powerlessness that 
can result can, and seemingly has, led some men 
to channel their frustrations through violence both 
in inter-personal relations, as well as externally as 
they try and re-establish control and rectify their 
loss of identity through violence, including GBV.51 
Then there are the other social changes that have 
evolved out of the decades of conflict in the country, 
including the erosion of more conventional forms 
of moral authority. For many of the participants 
interviewed in the research, these changes were 
ascribed to the spread of liberal human rights 
principles in the post-CPA and post-independence 
periods by external actors, particularly those 
rights which allowed for increased choice 
amongst marginalised groups, such as women 
and juveniles.52 As earlier research in South 
Sudan has highlighted, concepts of human rights, 
especially the rights of women and children, have 
developed a negative association and are seen 
as foreign and inherently antithetical to local 
customs on the ground.53 This is particularly 
accurate for older generations for whom “human 
rights and absolute freedom”54 were to blame 
for transgressions of gender and age-specific 
expectations. Those who were viewed as being 
in breach of traditional norms were identified as 
having disgraced the community.55 To avoid this, 
disciplinary action was, and still is, sometimes 
viewed as necessary for getting young men and 
women to comply with their conventional gender 
and age-related roles.56 Chiefs in one of the Juba 
PoC sites talked about how: “after independence, 
they [the government]…haven’t set and defined 
‘freedom.’ They just set freedom where you do 
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what you want to, but they should have defined 
it. Now it is open and a child can drink and smoke 
and go to lodges [brothels].”57 Liberal human 
rights frameworks were considered to be an 
impediment to meting out punishments geared 
not only at controlling individual behavior, but 
also at preventing violence. This is an aspect of 
custom that is both against and in alignment to 
the more universal goals of conflict mitigation 
and violence reduction, including GBV. The same 
group of chiefs: “why do white people pretend they 
don’t have culture? The white man will tell you that 
it is the right of a woman to sleep with a man if 
she wants…for us, our culture doesn’t say that and 
if we leave it the way the white man wants then 
people will fight…our shelters are burned.”58 
Importantly, for the purposes of this research 
paper, it is not just women and girls who are 
discriminated against and reduced to transactions 
in South Sudan’s political marketplace.59 Male 
youth are valued almost solely for the role that 
they play in violence and defense, reducing their 
worth to the pursuit of factional interests that are 
often not their own. Much like women, they fall 
outside of political structures, which in addition to 
being almost squarely male, continue to dominate 
opportunities for upward mobility. 60 They also fall 
outside community structures that continue to be 
concerned with regulating the behavior of young 
people.61 As Westendorf makes apparent in her 
analysis of female participation in the 2005 CPA, 
this exclusion is not an accident but an intentional 
strategy that acts to fortify existing power 
structures that restrict the potential for more 
inclusive systems encompassing the interests of 
marginalised groups.62 Again, this is nothing new. 
As she puts forth, “the conflicts among South 
Sudanese that animated the Second Sudanese 
57  FGD. (28 May 2019). Chiefs. Juba PoC Site, South Sudan.
58  FGD. (28 May 2019). Chiefs. Juba PoC Site, South Sudan. 
59  SIHA Network. (2019). Caught in the middle: Gender inequality and rampant SGBV in Wau, South Sudan.
60  See, Leonardi, C. (2007). ‘Liberation’ or Capture: Youth in between ‘hakuma’, and ‘home’ during Civil War and Its Aftermath in South-
ern Sudan. African Affairs 106(424): 391–412.
61  See, Leonardi, C. (2007). ‘Liberation’ or Capture: Youth in between ‘hakuma’, and ‘home’ during Civil War and Its Aftermath in South-
ern Sudan. African Affairs 106(424): 391–412.
62  Westendorf, J.K. (2018). Peace negotiations in the political marketplace: The implications of women’s exclusion in the Sudan-
South Sudan peace process. Australian Journal of International Affairs 72(5): 433-454. 
63  Westendorf, J.K. (2018). Peace negotiations in the political marketplace: The implications of women’s exclusion in the Sudan-
South Sudan peace process. Australian Journal of International Affairs 72(5): 433-454.
64  Danish Refugee Council. (2017). Dynamics of youth and violence: Findings from Rubkona County, Unity State. 
65  Danish Refugee Council. (2017). Dynamics of youth and violence: Findings from Rubkona County, Unity State. 
66  Danish Refugee Council. (2017). Dynamics of youth and violence: Findings from Rubkona County, Unity State.
war, the marginalisation of certain groups…
from state structures continued to animate the 
interactions between groups and the society and 
the new state of South Sudan after the war.”63 It 
should be noted that the position of female youth 
in those structures is even more precarious. 
Unlike their male counterparts, female youth 
are frequently denied the chance to be youth 
altogether. Although connoting a social group, the 
term “youth” in South Sudan signifies a category 
that has come to be understood as being almost 
entirely male.64 Indeed, for girls, the division 
between childhood and adulthood is more so 
defined by marriage,65 with care duties and child, 
early and forced marriages preventing many 
female youth the opportunity to experience the 
period of actually being “youth.”
As it is in many parts of the world, marriage and 
child rearing are often the dividing line between 
youthhood and adulthood. Although child, early 
and forced marriages make marriage a sad but 
premature reality for females, for males it is 
much different. Economic decline connected to 
the conflict, coupled with the aforementioned 
targeting of livelihoods during warring, including 
the extensive raiding of livestock has left many 
young males without the resources that they need 
to marry – something that is true for both rural and 
urban youth. 66  As alluded to in the introduction, 
lacking the prospect of marriage and unable to 
reach ideals of both responsible adulthood and 
masculinity, some male youths have opted to join 
militias or gangs, expressing themselves through 
violence and vigilantism. Participating in violence, 
whether in the form of criminality as is the case 
with gangs, or in raiding or revenge attacks as is 
the case with rural militias, can be a way for youth 
to access resources, while also reducing their 
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dependency on community structures, such as 
elders for things like marriage, especially as these 
community structures exclude them.67 
While many of the accounts of South Sudan have 
painted a picture of a predatory state that has 
contributed to fractionalisation and the almost 
complete collapse of order on the ground,68 as 
other research has shown, the neo-patrimonial 
position of elite-driven politics is reductionist, 
denying agency to local actors who can and 
do find ways to both navigate, resist and usurp 
both formal and informal systems that are 
exclusionary and exploitative.69 The young men 
(and sometimes women) who comprise militias 
and gangs are no different. While their actions 
are, at times, driven by factors connected to 
elite politics, their violent practices, organisation 
and every-day functioning is not limited to the 
diktats of customary or statutory leaders and 
represents both an adherence and opposition to 
the control that customary chiefs and political 
elites have tried to exert over them for years. As 
reflected in past scholarship on South Sudan, for 
the largely male youth who make up the basis of 
community-embedded armed groups, this has 
manifested itself in continued support to the 
norms associated with family and home life,70 as 
well as a desire to establish an identity of their 
own.71 Young men, in particular, are frustrated not 
only with the failure of elites to share the spoils 
of war they so often perpetrate on their behalf, 
but also with the wider failure of the political and 
military establishment to deliver on the dividends 
connected to successive, but often failed 
attempts at peace and state making. 72
67  See, Leonardi, C. (2007). ‘Liberation’ or Capture: Youth in between ‘hakuma’, and ‘home’ during Civil War and Its Aftermath in South-
ern Sudan. African Affairs 106(424): 391–412; SIHA Network. (2019). Caught in the middle: Gender inequality and rampant SGBV in Wau, 
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69  Kindersley, N. (2019). Rule of whose law? The geography of authority in Juba, South Sudan. J. of Modern African Studies 57(1): 
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Sudan. African Affairs 106(424): 391–412. 
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73  Young, J. (2016). Popular Struggles and Elite Co-optation: The Nuer White Army in South Sudan’s Civil War. HSBA Working Paper 41. 
74  Hutchinson, S.E. (2000). Nuer ethnicity militarized. Anthropology Today: p. 8 
IV. Case Study 1. Rural Militias 
Rural militias are an apt illustration of exactly 
these dynamics. Ever since the war with the 
Khartoum government in the north in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the number of southern militias 
proliferated rapidly, which was particularly 
accurate of the period following the dissolution 
of the SPLA in 1991. Following Machar’s split 
with the late SPLA founder, John Garang, Nuer 
cattle camp youth were mobilised under the 
auspices of the ‘White Army’ to attack Bor Town 
slaughtering Dinka populations in what became 
one of the most emblematic events of intra-South 
violence in the war between 1983 and 2005. More 
than that, the incident precipitated the reification 
of inter and intra ethnic divisions in the south. 
It also gave rise to the more overt militarisation 
of loosely organised groups of agro-pastoralist 
youth who had long identified on the basis of 
clan and sub-clan affiliation rather than ethnicity 
as such. In juxtaposition to the White Army, the 
Dinka-based titweng or gelweng was established 
to defend against Nuer attacks on community 
assets, including livestock73 and support military 
operations. While different than the sort of 
cohesive militia units that might come to mind, 
characterised, instead, by constantly shifting 
constellations of actors and objectives, since the 
1990s both groups have come to play important 
roles in various conflicts, at times fighting 
alongside more formal forces. The gelweng, for 
instance, are said to have participated in the 
2015 government offensive against Panyjiar in 
southern Unity State, raiding cattle to take back 
to Yirol in Lakes State. The White Army, or what 
have come to be mostly known as the gojam in 
southern Unity State have also been drawn into 
the conflict with the government and their allied 
militias, which has merely compounded the “rapid 
polarisation and militarisation…ethnic identities” 
that started after 1991.74 
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In Unity State, the genesis of the White Army have 
been different than in the eastern Nuerlands in 
places like Akobo.75 Much like their counterparts 
in areas of Jonglei and Upper Nile States, however, 
they too have developed through different 
stages of conflict, sometimes demonstrating 
considerable operational mobility in both national 
and localised conflicts and other times retreating 
back to everyday life in the cattle camps.76 In the 
context of the conflict that started in December 
2013, both seem to have been motivated at 
one level to avenge for the killings of their Nuer 
comrades in Juba when fighting initially broke out 
in the capital city.77 On another level, they seem 
driven to protect and defend their clan affiliates 
much more locally from encroachment by other 
groups – an imperative for survival. That being 
said, for those in Unity State their position is 
oftentimes much more defensive, fending off 
advances from the SPLA (now SSPDF) and 
government-supported groups of armed youth. 
This could, in part, account for why the western 
Nuer in Unity State eventually re-designated 
themselves the ‘gojam,’ which was a nickname for 
a former bodyguard in the SPLA,78 but has also 
been said to signify a powerful gun that does not 
jam in fighting, and more broadly, a new iteration 
of the White Army whose purpose is to contend 
with the central government in Juba after the end 
of 2013. As a group of gojam members remarked: 
“we are a group who are defending and we are 
the cattle keepers and we are civilian youth…we 
don’t have uniform…we have guns…choosing the 
meaning of ‘gojam’ it is a type of AK-47, which 
is very strong…previous generation was white 
75  See, Justice Africa. (2018). ‘They left us with spears and came back with guns’: Armed youth, cattle raiding and community (in)
security in Southern Unity State, South Sudan. A Report by Justice Africa and the Assistance Mission for Africa: 1-34. 
76  See, Wild, H., Jok, M.J. and Patel, R. (2018). The militarization of cattle raiding in South Sudan: how a traditional practice became a 
tool for political violence. Journal of International Humanitarian Action 3(2). 
77  Wild, H., Jok, M.J. and Patel, R. (2018). The militarization of cattle raiding in South Sudan: how a traditional practice became a tool 
for political violence. Journal of International Humanitarian Action 3(2). 
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for political violence. Journal of International Humanitarian Action 3(2).
84  Pendle, N. (2015). “They are now community police”: Negotiating the boundaries and nature of the Government in South Sudan 
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army, now we are gojam.”79 At the start of the war, 
they mobilised themselves to fight government 
forces, successfully defeating what was left of 
them in Bentiu and Leer in 2014.80 They were also 
one of the last bastions of defense in Panyjiar 
in the southern-most part of Unity State in 2015 
and have arguably been largely responsible 
for the area remaining under the firm territorial 
control of the SPLA-IO since then (although 
the extreme topographic isolation of the area 
has also assisted).81 Even so, they never fully 
integrated into the armed opposition. As revealed 
through research undertaken by, Justice Africa 
in 2016, the gojam felt resentment towards the 
formal forces of the SPLA-IO who never helped 
them recover cattle stolen in the course of the 
government offensive that swept through the 
area in 2015, particularly those that were raided 
by SPLA supported elements of the gelweng in 
neighbouring Lakes State.82
The gelweng have long supported the military 
components of the SPLA, including through the 
provision of cattle to help sustain the more formal 
forces.83 By and large, they were a response to 
the insecurity faced by Nuer ethnic militias, but 
they quickly turned into something much closer 
to a proxy force as the SPLA under Garang’s 
leadership forced pastoralist youth to abandon 
age-set systems.84 After the end of the previous 
civil war in 2005, some gelweng were assimilated 
into the civilian administration and at some point 
set up as community police.85 Select members 
have also served as a recruitment base into 
more specialised ethnic forces, such as the Döt 
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ku Beny, which according to other research, has 
consolidated the role of Dinka pastoralists in the 
actual security services.86 Yet, for the most part the 
gelweng do not fall under the direct leadership of a 
military commander, at least on a day-to-day basis 
where they continue to correspond to the typical 
“cattle guard.”87 In fact, in interviews members 
would ordinarily refer to themselves variously as 
the “eyes of the community” connoting the fact 
that they remained outside the reach of the state 
apparatus. A group of gelweng in Yirol: “[w]e are the 
ones who are responsible for protecting cattle in 
the cattle camp.”88 Another group of gelweng: “the 
reason we are called gelweng, we used to stay far 
from the government, so we are like government 
and we make security on our side where there is 
no side and now you will protect your own cows. 
Everyone likes cows and people come and pick.”89 
As Pendle makes clear through her research, as 
‘protectors’ or ‘guardians’ of the cattle, they have 
received investments from elites who have kept 
their wealth in the form of cattle herds in South 
Sudan’s remote cattle camps.90 Defense of these 
herds has informed an important element of their 
roles in the post-CPA period.91 However, it does 
not stop there. As touched upon already, similar to 
the gogam, the gelweng have been mobilised as 
proxies in both offensive and defensive operations 
after 2013, and arguably much more so than the 
gojam. In Lakes State, as well as elsewhere in the 
country, including the Bhar-el Ghazal region, they 
have been supported by the SPLA then SSPDF to 
conduct de facto military campaigns against the 
opposition and surrounding communities, as has 
been the case in the Jur River area around Wau. 
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Even with these differences, the two groups display 
a number of similarities. Just as it was in the 1990s, 
elites on either side of the divide within the SPLA 
since 2013 have used violence and patronage 
as a way to secure the allegiances of pastoralist 
youth in both Dinka and Nuer areas. Promises of 
access to resources has been used as a basis for 
mobilising youth, yet, for that same reason, their 
loyalties remain incredibly fluid with their rationale 
for violence being one of material reward  and 
necessity, rather than political affiliation.92 To 
the extent that the armed youth who comprise 
groups, such as the gojam or gelweng express 
any sense of loyalty, it is oftentimes in relation to 
protecting their cattle and their community where 
allegiance is demonstrated with respect to the 
‘county’ at best, as opposed to the country. As 
other research has shown, pastoralist youth have 
long been marginalised from the formal aspects 
of the ‘state.’93 During fieldwork it was clear 
that the government extracted from pastoralist 
communities in different ways, whether through 
exacting taxes, or through mobilising them 
to protect the peripheries in highly contested 
borderlands, including the area between Panyjiar 
and Yirol East. The youth who participate in 
the likes of the gojam and the gelweng rarely 
resemble more formal militias outside of fighting 
and have little in the way of consistent sense of 
commitment to the battles being fought by elites 
both at the national and the state level.94
For elites who can exploit local grievances and 
ensure steady access to livestock, as well as 
arms and ammunition, those elites will be able 
to temporarily bid for their loyalty.95 However, 
again, this is fleeting and it is this very dynamic 
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that makes rural armed male youth such a threat 
to the formal state. Armed by the government or 
other parties to the conflict as wars have evolved 
in South Sudan, control over these groups 
remains minimal at best. This reality has been 
apparent time and again as militaries on either 
side of the conflict have tried to subsequently 
disarm those who they armed in the first instance, 
contributing to violent confrontations. Palpable 
demonstrations of this took place shortly after 
the CPA was signed in 2005 and marked the 
beginning of a series of violent disarmament 
campaigns that only acted to inflame intra-South 
grievances and violence, but also saw the violent 
resistance of armed youth to taking away one 
of the few means they have for both protection 
and accessing resources. Since the war started 
at the end of 2013, both the SPLA, now SSPDF, 
and the SPLA-IO have tried often unsuccessfully 
to disarm their allied youth militias and exert 
control over them. As articulated in the preceding 
section, even if community-embedded armed 
groups, such as the gogam and gelweng have 
been instrumentalised by elites, they are not 
passive subjects of patronage. They are agents 
whose participation in violence and violent 
repertoires, including GBV, as well as interactions 
can be viewed as part of an effort to reduce their 
reliance on structures that have both exploited 
and excluded them. 
During periods of mobilisation both the gojam 
and the gelweng approximate something of 
an informal and ad hoc military or army with a 
relatively flat hierarchal structure,96 which has 
not always made either particularly amenable 
to showing restraint on the battlefield, at least 
outside of the local norms that govern behaviour 
and violence. Most of the time they look akin to 
a loosely configured group of armed male youth 
who share both generational and location-specific 
traits, with life revolving around cattle-keeping.97 
A group of gojam says how: “[o]ur military unit is 
called gojam and led by leaders in various Payams. 
96  Pendle, N. (2018). Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War. 
97  Pendle, N. (2018). Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War. 
98  FGD. (14 May 2019). Gojam. Panyjiar, South Sudan. 
99  FGD. (12 May 2019). Gojam. Panyjiar, South Sudan. 
100  Pendle, N. (2018). Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War. 
101  Pendle, N. (2018). Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War. 
102  FGD. (13 May 2019). Gojam. Panyjiar, South Sudan. 
103  FGD. (3 March 2019). Gelweng. Yirol, South Sudan. 
We are protecting our cattle from the enemy.”98 
Another group of gojam: “we are untrained armed 
youth…we have a responsibility to protect cows 
and the community. We are local defense.”99 
Herein lies one of the reasons for their otherwise 
loose affiliations and lack of fealty to elites. As 
Pendle has underlined, the loyalties of many male 
youth remain firmly with the groups that they 
share cattle camps with and the communities 
where they reside.100 They are socialised and 
initiated into their roles as community defenders 
at a young age.101 It is during this period in which 
the gendered roles of men and women are 
learned. For the most part, women’s worth in the 
cattle camp is equated with the value that they 
can command in terms of bridewealth and the 
roles that they play as wives and child bearers. 
Conversely, but not all that dissimilar, men’s worth 
is intrinsically linked to community defense and 
their ability to carry out violence in support of their 
communities. These gender norms are strictly 
reinforced. The very idea of women participating 
in the gojam or gelweng as fighters was scoffed 
at during research. Even where participants 
recognised the role that women could play in 
both reconnaissance missions and in providing 
support, the question would often be met with 
retorts, including: “…they don’t go on cattle raids. 
They don’t know how to run,”102 “they don’t fight…
they bring water.”103 
Life in the cattle camps where members of the 
gojam and gelweng reside violently buttresses 
conventional gendered roles, as well as the 
patriarchal norms and practices that support 
them. Women’s rights are not conceived of as 
something that can be legitimately claimed 
but were viewed instead as the obligations that 
females held to their households and the broader 
cattle camp in terms of gathering and preparing 
food, fetching water, collecting dung, milking 
cattle and cleaning. Although GBV inside cattle 
camps is customarily prohibited, there are cases 
that do occur, which are resolved by traditional 
chiefs. As is well-known, customary court 
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decisions rarely reflect the individual needs and 
desires of survivors and are oftentimes aimed at 
restoring the social equilibrium in a system that 
is primarily based on the payment of bridewealth 
(and, as such, the commodification of women 
and girls). Along those lines, the importance of 
bridewealth economies lies at the heart of how 
much of how communities’ function and operate. 
The exchange of livestock for marriage not only 
binds families into compound lineages, but also 
marks an important transition into adulthood for 
pastoralist youth who rely on cattle to get married 
and have children. Citing the same group of gojam 
members above: “our food security is our cows and 
this is what brings about children…We are happy 
to have cows. Each and everyone is qualified to 
get married and take wives and make children.”104 
Once more, the payment of bridewealth not only 
commodifies women and girls, but also acts as an 
important reason for their abuse. “your wife, you 
paid for her and if she is not performing, then you 
have the right to beat her because you paid a lot 
of resources…we cant get our cows back and that 
is why you keep beating until she listens.”105 This 
creates cycles of violence for female populations 
who are oftentimes subjected to child, early and 
forced marriages, domestic abuse and marital 
rape throughout the course of their lifetime. It 
also engenders cycles of violence in communities 
where attacks against women are viewed as an 
assault on a family’s livelihoods. Indeed, it is 
exactly because GBV represents an affront to 
familial and communal livelihoods that makes 
rape and other related offenses such effective 
weapons on South Sudan’s frontlines. However, as 
already referenced in relation to the functioning of 
the country’s political marketplace, it also further 
reduces women and girls to transactions. 
Both Dinka and Nuer pastoralists possess codes 
of conduct, or rules of warfare that are meant to 
apply during both localised and national conflicts, 
104  FGD. (12 May 2019). Gojam. Panyjiar, South Sudan. 
105  FGD. (13 May 2019). Gojam. Panyjiar, South Sudan.
106  Pendle, N. (2018). Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War; Hutchinson, S.E. (2000). 
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107  Pendle, N. (2018). Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War; Hutchinson, S.E. (2000). 
Nuer ethnicity militarized. Anthropology Today: 6-13.
108  FGD. (13 May 2019). Gojam. Panyjiar, South Sudan. 
109  Pendle, N. (2018). Chapter 5. Community-embedded armed groups. In ICRC The roots of restraint in War. 
110  FGD. (5 March 2019). Gelweng. Yirol, South Sudan. 
111  UN Human Rights Council. 2019. Report of the Commission of Human Rights in South Sudan.” A/HRC/40/69. 
including protections for vulnerable groups, such 
as women.106 As has been made clear in previous 
research, violence against women was not only 
forbidden, but was seen as morally reprehensible 
and could result in death or other ill-fortune, 
conceived of as a provocation to God.107 Both 
members of the gojam and the gelweng made 
reference to these codes of conducts throughout 
the course of the research, however, they also 
recognised that violence in the distant peripheries 
where most fighting takes place, is unregulated. 
As on group of gojam stated in reference to acts 
of rape committed in the border areas between 
Unity and Lakes States: “[t]hat one is a different 
territory…that is a minor thing to be reported. No 
one will know what you did.”108 In other research, 
where any restraint has been shown, this has 
evidently been in relation to rape as opposed to the 
abduction and taking of wives.109 A member of the 
gelweng: “when you don’t have anything and you 
are hungry, you may abduct someone so you can 
get something from her [assumed to mean sex].”110 
This is not necessarily unexpected. As mentioned 
in the above section, commanders and elites 
responsible for mobilising groups of armed youth 
in the national conflict have used the promises of 
taking wives as an incentive for participating in 
fighting.111 This has normalised abduction, sexual 
slavery and other acts of CSRV and the reduction 
of women and girls to transactions in South 
Sudan’s political marketplace. As mentioned in 
another section, the exchange of women and 
girls whether at home or the frontlines, has also 
become an increasingly important resource that 
can be provided to pastoralists in exchange for 
their participation in fighting. 
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V. Case Study 2. Urban Gangs 
Urban gangs are similar in many respects to the 
rural militias described here and are born out of 
the same problems of fractionalisation, as well as 
state and economic disorder. As other research 
on South Sudan has pointed out, many of these 
gangs can be understood as part of the broader 
shifts that have occurred in the context of 
failed state and nation building projects and the 
collapse of community structures.112 The gangs 
or what are colloquially referred to as “nigga 
groups” in many ways comprise a social and 
economic community akin to a cattle camp, and 
like both the gojam or the gelweng, the groups 
provide members with a sense of belonging and 
empowerment that is often inculcated through 
adolescence and youth.113 It should be noted that 
the term “nigga” does not have the same racialised 
connotations as does in the West, but as another 
report asserted, simply designates a social group 
that comes together with their own set of values 
and seeks to connect to a culture outside of South 
Sudan – that culture regularly being connected to 
hip hop in North America.114 This is reflected in 
some of the gang names, as well as the individual 
names that members take on, which tend to make 
reference to hip hop icons. Indeed, the members 
rarely see themselves as ‘niggas,’ which for the 
most part marks societal views of these groups 
as having adopted styles of dress, attitudes 
and musical tastes that go against the grain of 
conventional, local values.115 Therein lies one of 
the main commonalities between the groups. 
That is, the fact that they are viewed derogatorily 
as a threat to traditional norms.116 This is not 
necessarily because the gangs are comprised 
of criminals. While some groups are criminal, 
targeting the urban poor, including internally 
displaced persons in places like the PoC sites, 
112  LSE. (2010). Southern Sudan at odds with itself: Dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace. 
113  See, Danish Refugee Council. (2017). Dynamics of youth and violence: Findings from Rubkona County, Unity State. 
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Schwartz, S. (2011). Dowry and division: Youth and state building in South Sudan. USIP Special Report 295. 
117  McCrone, F. (2016). Justice displaced: Field notes on criminality and insecurity in South Sudan’s UN Protection of Civilian Sites. A 
report by Justice Africa written and compiled by Flora McCrone. 
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121  See, Leonardi, C., Moro, L. N., Santschi, M., & Isser, D.H. (2010). Local justice in Southern Sudan. Peaceworks No. 66.
122  Sommers, M. and Schwartz, S. (2011). Dowry and division: Youth and state building in South Sudan. USIP Special Report 295. 
this is not true across the board.117 
Again, these groups are nothing new to South 
Sudan and had become a growing menace in 
a number of urban centres in the post-CPA and 
post-independence periods.118 Youth returning to 
South Sudan after 2005 were coming back from 
places like Khartoum and Cairo and other peri-
urban environments, such as the large refugee 
camps in Kenya where they were exposed to 
different cultures, including hip hop culture.119 
The groups did not all form within South Sudan 
and had been shaped by refugee experiences 
in the diaspora where South Sudanese youth 
would come together to network, particularly in 
Khartoum and Cairo. This is not to say that all 
youth gangs consist of returnees,120 yet it is really 
after 2005 that gangs had been a significant 
source of contention. As discussed in another 
section, the justice system was seen as being 
too sympathetic to members of the gangs, which 
was ascribed to the proliferation of liberal human 
rights frameworks by the international actors 
who streamed into South Sudan following the 
2005 CPA.121 At the same time, like rural militias, 
the groups were also said to be implicated 
with political, business and security elites – an 
accusation that continues to be lodged with 
respect to their relationship to the security forces 
in some locations. After a crackdown on gangs in 
2009, authorities had reportedly found that many 
members were receiving arms from officials.122 
Today, the same sort of dynamic has been 
alleged to occur in Wau Town, with the supposed 
provision of protection to the groups in exchange 
for remuneration. Much in the same way that 
cattle camp youth are open to manipulation by 
politicians, so too are urban youth and youth 
gangs who can be coopted by more powerful 
actors pursuing their own factional interests. 
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Even so, the reasons that many youths give for 
joining gangs rarely have anything to do with 
connections to political and military elites. Akin 
to the gogam and the gelweng, when these 
affiliations materialise, it seems more so to be 
a matter of opportunity, with loyalties lying with 
their peers and the sense of community that they 
derive from being in the group. This is one of the 
defining features of the gangs interviewed in both 
Wau and Juba. Unlike militias, gangs seemingly 
organise across axes of conflict, including ethnic 
and clan lines. In the Juba PoC sites, for example, 
the groups often represented different Nuer clans 
who in the national conflict have been marred 
in violent competition. They also apparently 
collaborate with their counterparts outside the 
PoC sites who come from different ethnic groups 
altogether. One of the gangs interviewed in the 
Juba PoC sites indicated that when the civil war 
broke out in December 2013, Dinka members 
had rescued Nuer members and taken them to 
the UNMISS base for protection. Comparable 
dynamics were apparent in Wau where Fertit, 
Dinka and Luo would all apparently organise 
under the umbrella of a single gang. Although 
there is a certain territoriality to the way that 
the groups mobilise. Participants from gangs, 
as well as other key informants understood this 
mixed organisation on the basis that members 
identified primarily as “youth” as opposed to part 
of the conflict that has otherwise seen their lives 
upended. As one former member explained: “…
most of them are mixed. They are not having 
something like tribalism for them the important 
thing is the group. The group is best.”123 A current 
member says that the reason has to do with 
mixing with other ethnic groups: “for us [it is] to 
introduce ourselves to other ethnic groups and try 
and fight tribalism and this is this way, but we are 
all under the umbrella of the group.”124
An enhanced sense of responsibility was another 
key reason for engaging in gangs. A member of 
one of the groups interviewed in Wau Town said 
that the group had started in 2012 as a way to 
feel pride and responsibility: “for me it is about 
responsibility…we have portfolios in the group 
like chairperson and secretary and treasurer and 
123  KII. (18 February 2019). Former Gang Member. Wau Town. 
124  FGD. (15 February 2019). Gang Members. Wau Town.
125  FGD. (15 February 2019). Gang Members. Wau Town. 
this is how I become a responsible man and this 
is a good thing that helps us take responsibility 
in our future life.”125 This desire for increased 
responsibility has its basis in the structure of 
most of the groups and is an important part of 
how members try to achieve ideals of responsible 
adulthood through non-traditional means. 
Even where the groups differed, most of those 
interviewed across both Wau Town and the Juba 
PoC sites retained a boss at the top in a mob-like 
structure, a deputy boss and different ministers 
who carried out functions that corresponded to 
other formal administrations. The ‘Minister of 
Defense,’ for instance, was said to be responsible 
for negotiating with competing groups, the 
‘Minister of Finance’ would take care of the fiscal 
affairs of the group and so on. Many members 
would be required to pay a membership fee 
ordinarily in the form of a monthly contribution 
that tended to range between 2,000 and 3,000 
South Sudanese Pounds, equivalent to seven 
to 10 US Dollars at the time of the research in 
2019. The purpose of these funds ranged from 
assisting other members in paying for school 
fees, as well as helping both male and female 
members in the case of an unwanted pregnancy 
by paying compensation to the girl’s family. A 
point should be made along these lines. Although 
in some cases, unwanted pregnancies were the 
result of negligence, in other cases, male gang 
members wanting to get married but lacking the 
economic resources to do so, viewed pregnancy 
as a way to hold onto their girlfriends. From a 
sexual and reproductive health perspective, this 
means that increasing access to contraception is 
not always the answer, which may lie more so in 
understanding youth struggles and desires.
The contributions were also used to finance 
the parties that groups hold, which are one of 
their chief activities and a way for gangs to 
differentiate themselves from other groups, as 
well as a form of entertainment and networking. 
During these parties, members are said to dress 
up to demonstrate the unique character of their 
particular group and in some instances perform 
‘dances’ as a way to distinguish themselves from 
the other groups in attendance. The parties were 
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also a way for male members to interact with 
females, which was another strong rationale for 
joining groups. One member in Wau Town: “when 
I came to Wau, I was introduced to the group and 
I saw what they are doing. One of the main things 
that makes me want to join is the ladies. It enables 
me to talk to them.”126 This was reflected in other 
research on youth in Rubkona, Unity State where 
parties in the Bentiu PoC site were said to be a way 
for groups to connect with girls.127 Yet, it is also 
indicative of the ways in which gang activity both 
contravenes and resists the strict traditionalism 
of South Sudanese society, which for the most 
part regulates sex and relationships outside of 
marriage At the same time, these parties are also 
sites of conflict with other groups, and as such, 
have been said to be sites of violence, including 
purported cases of GBV. And while most groups 
did have some level of regulations against the use 
of sexual violence, these rules were predominantly 
oriented inwards to the treatment of female 
members, opening up the possible use of GBV to 
females associated with different groups. 
This is perhaps one of the starker contrasts with 
rural militias in that gangs incorporate some 
degree of female membership. The number of 
girls joining groups was actually said to be on 
the rise with some gangs creating sub-groups for 
their female counterparts, which is likely partly 
attributable to the greater need to associate 
within peer groups to overcome the trauma of 
war. As a group of female gang members in one 
of the Juba PoC sites remarked: “it is good for 
us to be members of Risk Gang Group. It helps 
us share ideas and challenges. Life in the PoC 
is very hard. You cannot live a happy life if you 
live alone. It is better to associate…and be able to 
share your problems.”128 While much assistance 
is targeted towards female populations, this aid 
can sometimes ignore the needs of adolescent 
females.129 For some of the female gang 
members interviewed, they felt that they were 
not seen, compounding feelings of distress. The 
same group of female members responded as 
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follows when asked about their interaction with 
humanitarian partners: “[we don’t have] much 
interaction with them. They see us [girls] like 
shadows. If we are trained, we will be able to 
avoid some of the bad things happening here in 
the PoC.”130 
Punishment for acts of GBV for the groups ranged 
from a warning to immediate dismissal. While 
there are codes of conduct and rules for some 
groups, some of which apparently encompass 
prohibitions on violence, based on the initial 
findings, these do not seem to be explicit on GBV. 
At the same time, there have been accounts of 
gang rape perpetrated at some of the parties 
and male members engaging in verbal and 
sometimes physical harassment of girls outside 
the group, especially those associated with rival 
gangs.131 Outside of the use or potential use of 
GBV by members of gangs, the structures of the 
gangs often reiterated the same gender norms 
that discriminate against women and girls in 
South Sudanese society. This is in spite of the fact 
that the ability of groups to organise across lines 
of conflict represents a form of resistance to the 
parochialism in South Sudan. During the parties, 
girls are often made to cook and clean and invite 
other females, which has changed little with their 
growing numbers – “…their responsibility is to 
cook when there is a party…now their numbers of 
increased…[but] they are still cooking and doing 
the same things even though they have larger 
numbers,”132 said one gang member. Outside of 
parties, female members are expected to provide 
male members with moral support. Although 
male members are encouraged to date outside 
the gang, in some of the cases heard during the 
research, girls’ ability to date outside the gang 
was restricted and could even result in removal. 
As McCrone highlighted in her reflections on 
gang violence in the PoC sites, “[t]hough the 
customary norms around marriage and marital 
sex were apparently less important to ‘nigga’ 
team members, the tendency towards treating 
women as a commodity prevailed.”133
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Conclusions and Policy 
Implications 
With that, the ways in which both rural militias 
and urban gangs interpret and regulate gender 
and GBV, as well as in some cases, perpetrate 
it, seem to mostly reinforce traditional gender 
roles that equate women with wives and child-
bearers and treat them as commodities. Whether 
in the endemic levels of gendered and sexualised 
violence and the inequalities that underscore 
such violence, or in the propensity of male youth 
to engage in crime in urban centres or localised 
conflicts in rural settings, there needs to be a 
more attention to the ways in which informal, 
non-state forms of public authority perpetuate 
structures of violence and discrimination.134 As 
other research on South Sudan has already put 
forth, interventions that want to promote gender 
equality and an end to GBV need to be cognizant 
of the realities of patrilineal bridewealth-based 
marriage practices that inform the functioning 
of local political economies.135 Without this, there 
is a considerable risk of a backlash against the 
rights that external actors are trying to encourage 
in the first place. Actors promoting human 
rights, including the rights of women and girls 
have for the most part assumed that education-
based approaches will translate automatically 
into new norms and practices.136 However, 
this significantly underestimates the reach of 
patrilocal, bridewealth-based systems137  and the 
commodification of women and girls that has 
been systematically reinforced through the effects 
of conflict. As evidenced in the final discussion 
on gangs, even where groups of mostly male 
youth have been able to transcend tribalism, they 
have not been able to rise above perceptions of 
females as commodities. The research presented 
here is just a preliminary step towards greater 
understanding; however, more detailed research 
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is needed to be able to fully contemplate how to 
dismantle the structures that marginalise women 
and girls, including those promulgated by non-
state forms of public authority. 
Many of these conclusions also apply to conflict 
and violence reduction more generally. The failure 
to take into consideration the local contextual 
factors that give rise to violent behaviour, whether 
insecurity in rural areas or criminality in urban 
areas, are likely to be met with little success. As 
other research has made clear, the long history 
of violence in South Sudan demonstrates the 
consequences of ignoring local dynamics, 
including dynamics related to exclusion/
inclusion.138 This is unfortunate considering the 
ability of these more localised manifestations of 
instability to jeopardise national-level settlements, 
including the 2018 R-ARCSS, which similar to 
the CPA has negated the more informal groups 
discussed in this paper, namely militias and 
gangs. This means trying to find new and creative 
ways of addressing the absence of opportunities 
and avenues of belonging that provide the mostly 
male youth who make up militias and gangs 
with a sense of inclusion and an alternative 
avenue for venting their frustrations outside 
of violence. It also entails working much more 
directly with those actually implicated in violence 
and crime and ensuring that non-state forms 
of public authority, including militias and gangs 
are integrated into interventions seeking to build 
peace and transform conflict. This is critical for 
ensuring a sense of ownership over norms of 
non-violence, including those norms prohibiting 
GBV. 
For the most part, those interviewed for the 
research, including both rural militias and urban 
gangs had not been engaged by external actors. 
When asked if they had any interaction with 
humanitarian partners, members of youth gangs 
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stated: “no, we have never had any interaction 
with the internationals, but we would be willing 
if people came. Those organisations, they are 
training youth…but they look at us like outlaws 
and criminals, but we are willing to attend any 
training.”139  Where members of militias or gangs 
had been engaged by external actors, it had often 
been through trainings on peacebuilding offered 
by local civil society activists who are more 
attuned to the realities on the ground. In some 
rarer instances where militias had been engaged 
by outside entities, this had often been on rules 
of combat and targeted the upper echelons of 
a command structure that does not really exist. 
A group of gojam leaders reflecting on these 
trainings said: “some officers are targeted to be 
trained so they can preach to others…We need 
inclusivity not just officers. The entire soldiers 
need to be trained. More on gender and more 
on human rights.”140 In the same way that there 
is no guarantee that trainings on human rights 
will translate into everyday practice, there is 
no promise that information filters down from 
leaders to the average cattle camp youth in 
remote parts of the country where they are often 
mobilised for violence, limiting the potential 
solutions to sources of instability.141 This does not 
mean that trainings are misguided. Another group 
of gojam members: “These are good topics that 
we have learned because they help us from doing 
crimes and to treat people fairly and to know your 
roles and responsibilities…[but] they also need to 
engage youth in the cattle camp and women in 
the cattle camp, including the prophets so that 
everybody will be accountable.”142 It means re-
thinking the actors that are engaged in violence 
prevention, creating targeted and localised 
responses developed in collaboration with a wider 
range of stakeholders, which should encompass 
those responsible for said violence.  
139  FGD. (15 February 2019). Gang Members. Wau Town. 
140  FGD. (12 May 2019). Sector Commanders, Gojam. Panyjiar, South Sudan. 
141  Hutchinson, S., & Pendle, N.R. (2015). Violence, legitimacy, and prophecy: Nuer struggles with uncertainty in South Sudan. Ameri-
can Ethnologist.
142  FGD. (14 May 2019). Gojam. Payjiar, South Sudan. 
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